BOURSE
Active on mainA2A v1.0 multi-vendor agent exchange — signed Agent Cards with pinned vendor keys, admission exams, a broker that picks agents by measured cost and reliability, deterministic quarantine, and an adversarial benchmark reported as n/N.
Tagged v1.0.0 — Phases 0–7 complete. 871 unit + 29 DB tests with CI green, 54 ADRs, a 17-service Compose stack plus 15 adversary agents, and 1 CI workflow; results are generated from tracked data and CI fails on drift. Frozen 100-case test split, Wilson 95% CIs: with adversaries in the pool, attack-caused harm 2/100 with the trust layer vs 64/100 without it, grader pass 83/100 vs 69/100; a 21-row attack suite caught 18/21 with 0/21 missed. Caveats: a quiet sleeper caused 6/14 harmed tasks before a canary caught it; on an honest-only pool the broker is 15% cheaper and 18% faster than random selection but not more accurate (85/100 vs 88/100); one local model on one machine.
Architecture
Vendors publish Agent Cards signed with JWS over RFC 8785 canonical JSON; the registry verifies them only against a JWKS pinned at onboarding, lints card text, runs a 5-task admission exam per skill, and stores every revision immutably. A LangGraph broker splits a dataset-intake job into typed subtasks and delegates each over A2A to the agent with the best expected utility (reliability lower bound minus cost and latency). Agents built on LangGraph, CrewAI and plain a2a-sdk use their own MCP tools; every LLM call goes through a metering proxy with per-task budgets, fair-share gating and a hard token cap in front of local Ollama models. Spot checks, canaries, an egress DNS sinkhole and usage-misreport checks feed a deterministic trust engine (HARD violations quarantine at once, SOFT ones count k=3 strikes per reliability epoch). Reinstatement needs a fresh exam plus a Slack approval from an allowlisted operator.
Key decisions
- Card signatures only prove who published a card — admission exams and measured outcomes decide whether an agent is listed and chosen (ADR-0023, ADR-0037)
- Safety decisions are code, never an LLM; card free text never reaches the selector, so a poisoned card was neutralised by design with outputs matching honest 76/76 (ADR-0008)
- Strikes are counted per reliability epoch, so reinstatement is a real fresh start, proven live with a re-catch after a Slack approval (ADR-0039, ADR-0048)
- Exam faults are attributed from meter evidence, so a stalling agent fails its exam instead of hiding behind "infrastructure timeout" (ADR-0049)
- One outcome function with written rules (caught / missed / ineffective / not exposed / error) and ablations that remove one control at a time: without the sinkhole exfiltration harm was 9/9, without card signatures A1–A3 got through (ADR-0053)
- Frozen test manifest, clean-worktree --final lock and results generated from data; limits published, including the quiet adversaries the spot checks could not see (ADR-0051, ADR-0054)
- A2A v1.0
- MCP
- LangGraph
- CrewAI
- JWS / JCS (RFC 8785)
- Pydantic
- Ollama
- Slack Bolt
- PostgreSQL
- Alembic
- OpenTelemetry
- Docker Compose